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N last year's Survey, we noted that over the past four years the courts
in Texas had gradually curtailed remedies available to persons claim-
ing harm from toxic substances and seeking redress for mass torts.
We queried whether the courts "finally achieved an equilibrium in bal-
ancing the rights of plaintiffs and defendants in toxic and mass tort litiga-
tion" or whether they "still perceive the need for additional procedural
and substantive restraints on such claims." 1
In the summer of 2007, the Texas Supreme Court provided a dramatic
answer. In Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores,2 the supreme court unanimously
reversed a modest award for a plaintiff claiming damages for a
nonmalignant asbestos-related disease, holding that the plaintiff had not
presented legally sufficient evidence that exposure to asbestos from the
defendant's product was a "substantial factor" in causing his injury. The
decision conclusively disproved the assumption long held by practitioners
that the plaintiff in an asbestos case satisfies his burden of production if
he can show that "the defendant supplied any of the asbestos to which the
plaintiff was exposed."' 3 Borg-Warner was quickly followed by the Texas
Supreme Court's opinion in In re Allied Chem. Corp.4 In that case, the
supreme court held that a trial court cannot set a mass tort case for trial
until the plaintiff identifies an expert who will testify that a particular
defendant's product or substance caused the plaintiff's specific injuries.5
The decision effectively creates, in the words of one dissent, "an inactive
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4. 227 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. 2007) (decided June 15, 2007).
5. Id. at 652.
1155
SMU LAW REVIEW
docket" for mass tort cases like this one. 6
National law firms representing defendants in toxic and mass tort liti-
gation duly reported these developments on their websites, with one firm
declaring that these decisions "signal a significant re-shaping of toxic tort
and mass tort litigation in Texas."'7 One publication company sponsored
a full-day seminar on the sole topic "Life after Borg-Warner v. Flores."
Neither state nor federal legislatures enacted any statutes specifically
addressing toxic or mass tort legislation during the Survey period. But it
is undoubtedly true that the decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, and
similar decisions of the courts of appeals described in this article, have
significantly altered the landscape for toxic and mass tort litigation in
Texas.
I. TEXAS MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TRANSFERS
AND PROCEEDINGS
In 2003, the Texas Legislature enacted the Texas Multidistrict Litiga-
tion ("MDL") Statute to authorize the transfer of multiple cases involv-
ing the same parties and issues to a single Texas district court for
consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings. 9 Although neither the
statute nor its legislative history identify mass tort litigation as a particu-
lar target of the enactment, observers typically consider complex mass
tort cases-often involving hundreds of plaintiffs asserting virtually iden-
tical allegations against the same defendants-to be most suitable for
MDL transfer.10 The first transfers pursuant to the Texas MDL statute
were the asbestos cases, the silica cases, and the Firestone tire tread sepa-
ration cases 1 -quintessential mass tort litigation.
But in this Survey period, the Texas MDL panel did not transfer any
actual or potential mass personal injury case to a pretrial court for coordi-
nated proceedings. It did receive a suggestion to transfer cases pending
in Tarrant and Burleson Counties in which the plaintiffs alleged that they
had developed diseases as a result of exposure to chemicals at a railroad
6. Id. at 664 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
7. "Leveling the Playing Field in Mass Tort Litigation: Texas Mass Tort Plaintiffs
Required to Present Causation Evidence Prior to Trial Setting," Latham & Watkins LLP
website, http://www.lw.com/Resources.aspx?page=ClientAlertDetail&publication=1921.
8. "Texas Asbestos & Silica Litigation: Life After Borg-Warner v. Flores," Oct. 16,2007, HarrisMartin Publishing Co., described at http://www.harrismartin.com/conference
detail.cfm?confid=47.
9. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 74.161-63 (Vernon 2005) are modeled after the federal
multistate litigation statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West 2005).
10. See Lynne Liberato & Laurie Ratliff, Not Just for Toxic Tort Cases: Strategic Use
of Multidistrict Litigation Consolidation, 71 TEX. B.J. 98, 99 (Feb. 2008) ("[M]ost expect
pretrial transfers under Rule 13 to be in mass tort cases with hundreds of cases and virtu-
ally identical allegations ... ").
11. Union Carbide v. Adams, 166 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Jud. MDL Panel 2003); In re Silica
Prods. Liab. Litig., 166 S.W.3d 3 (Tex. Jud. MDL Panel 2004); In re Firestone/Ford Litig.,
166 S.W.3d 2 (Tex. Jud. MDL Panel 2004).
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tie treatment plant in Somerville, Texas, which it summarily denied. 12 It
also denied a motion to transfer twenty cases involving personal injuries
sustained by maritime workers aboard various company dredges to a sin-
gle pretrial court, noting that the cases involved plaintiffs "injured at dif-
ferent times, in different states, on different vessels, while engaging in
different activities, resulting in different injuries. '' 13 And it granted a re-
quest to transfer ninety-one claims-including several wrongful death
claims and many more property damage claims-arising out of a massive
fire in the Texas Panhandle allegedly caused by the negligence of oil and
gas operators in maintaining their electrical wires and equipment.1 4 But
it did not consider, or even receive, any request to transfer the type of
classic mass tort, involving hundreds or thousands of claims involving in-
juries allegedly caused by a defective consumer or industrial product, or a
medical drug or device, or a toxic waste site, that it had considered in
previous years.
The reason for this dearth of MDL transfer requests of mass tort cases
is difficult to prove but hard to dispute: mass tort plaintiffs have been
discouraged from filing claims in Texas by years of adverse rulings and
legislation. Because the plaintiffs bar perceives Texas state courts to be
inhospitable to mass and toxic tort plaintiffs, it has chosen to pursue such
cases, if at all, in other jurisdictions. As a result, the Texas MDL Panel
did not entertain a single motion to transfer a mass tort to a district court
for coordinated pretrial proceedings, as it had in prior years.
MDL pretrial courts already presiding over mass tort cases avoided
making any sweeping global legal rulings, largely focusing on managing
discovery and remanding cases for trial. An exception was the asbestos
MDL pretrial court's decision on summary judgment motions on the is-
sue of causation asserted by the defendants in the wake of the Texas Su-
preme Court's landmark decision in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores. Both
Borg-Warner and the MDL pretrial court's application of the decision are
discussed in detail later in this article.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE LAW
A. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
1. Class Certification
In previous years, Texas courts provided a key arena for the debate on
whether mass torts can be resolved through the class action device. A
series of opinions from the Texas Supreme Court, beginning with South-
12. In re The Somerville R.R. Tie Treatment Plant, MDL No. 07-0380, available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MDLOrders/2007/070380order.pdf (July 10, 2007).
13. In re Pers. Injury Litig. Against Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., LLC, MDL No.
07-0025, available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MDLOrders/2007/070025op.
pdf (July 25, 2007), at *2.
14. In re Cano Petroleum, No. 07-0593 (order entered Sept. 25, 2007) available at http:/
/www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MDLOrders/2007/070593op.pdf (Jan. 2, 2008).
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western Refining Co. v. Bernal15 and continuing in non-mass tort cases
such as BMG Direct Marketing, Inc. v. Peake,16 appears to have put that
debate to rest: the consensus view among practitioners is that the typical
mass tort simply presents too many significant individual issues for the
case to qualify as a certifiable class action under Rule 42 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.17 Consequently, neither the Texas Supreme
Court nor the Texas appellate courts issued any decisions concerning the
propriety of an order certifying a class action in a mass tort case. Instead,
the courts have turned their attention to other procedural issues typical in
mass and toxic tort litigation, including the timing and number of cases
that may be set for trial, the scope of discovery appropriate in a complex
toxic tort case, the standing of parties to sue and the availability of man-
damus to correct defects in standing, the venue permissible for a toxic
tort case, the application of the statute of limitations to a claim based on
latent injury, and the availability of federal removal jurisdiction.
2. Case Management / Discovery Issues
In In re Allied Chemical Corp.,' 8 the majority continued the Texas Su-
preme Court's trend of discouraging the use of consolidation to resolve
"immature" mass torts, while the dissent questioned the use of an ex-
traordinary remedy for an issue that had become moot.19 Nearly 1,900
plaintiffs sued thirty defendants for exposure to chemicals from sites
where pesticides had been mixed or stored.20 Five years after filing, the
trial court set the first trial for five plaintiffs who varied by age, distance
from exposure site, years of exposure, and types of injury.21 Shortly
thereafter, the supreme court issued In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.,22
reversing "the same kind of order in the same kind of case in the same
county."'23 Pointing out that it has allowed consolidated trials for mature
torts such as asbestos, the supreme court urged "extreme caution" in con-
solidating trials of immature mass tort claims.2 4 The defendants brought
the Van Waters opinion to the attention of the trial court, but the court
declined to change the trial setting, and the Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals denied mandamus. When the supreme court stayed the case and
requested full briefing, the plaintiffs "retreated," seeking to proceed to
trial on just one plaintiff's claims.2 5
Rejecting the dissent's conclusion that this rendered the issue moot, the
Texas Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brister, stated it would not
15. 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000).
16. 178 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. 2005).
17. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42.
18. 227 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. 2007).
19. Id. at 654, 664-66.
20. Id. at 654.
21. Id.
22. 145 S.W.3d 203, 211 (Tex. 2004).
23. Allied Chem., 227 S.W.3d at 654.
24. Van Waters, 145 S.W.3d at 208.
25. Allied Chem.. 227 S.W.3d at 654.
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encourage parties "to manipulate pretrial discovery to evade appellate
review."'26 The court found the issue paralleled that in Able Supply Co. v.
Moye:27 the plaintiffs in a complex mass tort case had failed to identify
the medical experts who could identify the link between the plaintiffs'
diseases and the defendants' products.28 The supreme court noted that
although it generally does not consider interlocutory complaints about
trial settings, it did in Able Supply, and must do so in this case for three
reasons. First, the discovery order imposes a disproportionate burden on
one party; the burden of making thirty defendants prepare "in the dark"
for 1,900 claims outweighs the benefit of giving the plaintiffs more time,
after five years, to decide what injured them.2 9 Second, the denial of dis-
covery "goes to the heart of a party's case."'30 Third, the discovery order
severely compromises a party's ability to present a case at trial, as this is a
complex case and a bellwether trial.31 The supreme court prohibited set-
ting "any of the plaintiffs' claims for trial until the defendants have a
reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial after learning who will con-
nect their products to plaintiffs' injuries."'32 In his concurrence, Justice
Hecht reiterated the supreme court's concern with perceived patterns of
abuse in this type of case and the risk that such abuse will coerce settle-
ments irrespective of the merits of the claims.
3 3
In dissent, Chief Justice Jefferson, joined by Justices O'Neill, Wain-
wright, and Johnson, found the issue moot because nearly two years ear-
lier the plaintiffs supplemented their discovery responses, identifying
causation witnesses and producing expert reports.34 Moreover, although
the Texas Supreme Court had conditionally granted the writ to resolve an
Able Supply issue, that issue was not actually before the supreme court in
the current case, as the defendants never claimed plaintiffs' supplementa-
tion was inadequate. In contrast, the Able Supply plaintiffs had refused
to answer, and the trial court had declined to compel, interrogatory an-
swers. Nevertheless, the dissent complained, the majority used this case
"to create a procedural rule that, for the first time, creates an inactive
docket for 'complex mass tort cases like this one."' 35 The dissent sug-
gested that the problem perceived by the majority would best be resolved
by rulemaking procedures or legislation, not judicial decree. 36 In his own
dissent, Justice Wainwright added that if the court does "not require liti-
gants to avail themselves of the existing avenues for relief before seeking
unique and extraordinary mandamus remedies, then mandamus relief will
26. Id. at 655 (Brister, J., dissenting).
27. 898 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1995).
28. Allied Chem., 227 S.W.3d at 656.
29. Id. at 658.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 659.
33. Id. at 660-61 (Hecht, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 664 (Jefferson, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 666.
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cease being extraordinary .... ,,37
The tragic and well-publicized explosion at the British Petroleum
("BP") refinery in Texas City on March 23, 2005, is certain to generate
several opinions of interest to followers of mass tort litigation, but the
opinions from the case issued during this Survey period concerned the
important but relatively mundane areas of discovery and trial process.
Shortly after the explosion, BP reported to the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") that it had created a $700 million reserve to cover
claims for personal injury and death arising from the incident.38 The
plaintiffs sought discovery of the materials used by BP's in-house counsel
to compute the reserve figure. Opposing production, BP argued that the
documents were protected by the attorney-client and attorney work prod-
uct privileges and produced an affidavit prepared by its in-house counsel
describing the manner in which the estimate was prepared and the confi-
dential materials used to prepare the estimate. The trial court held that
the affidavit was conclusory and did not constitute a prima facie showing
that the documents were privileged, and ordered production. In an opin-
ion designated for publication, the First District Houston Court of Ap-
peals disagreed, holding that the affidavit was sufficiently detailed to
support BP's objection. 39 The court of appeals also rejected the trial
court's conclusion that BP waived its claims of privilege by disclosing the
existence of the reserve to the SEC and the media, noting that BP had
limited its disclosure to the reserve figure itself and did not share its
methodology with any outside personnel.40 The court thus directed that
the trial court consider BP's privilege objection on the merits.
Less than a month later, the First District Houston Court of Appeals41
granted mandamus to set aside the trial court's order authorizing "gavel
to gavel" television coverage of the first trial.42 The court noted that
Rule 18(c) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows broadcasting of
court proceedings only pursuant to rules promulgated by the Texas Su-
preme Court, when the dignity of the proceedings will not be impaired
and the parties consent, or when the proceedings are ceremonial. 43 The
court easily concluded that none of the conditions allowing the broadcast
of proceedings had been met and directed that the trial not be televised.44
In In re Exxon Corp.,45 the Beaumont Court of Appeals continued the
37. Id. at 667 (Wainright, J., dissenting).
38. In re BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., No. 01-06-00679-CV, 2006 WL 2973037 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 13, 2006, orig. proceeding).
39. Id. at *6.
40. Id. at *9.
41. Id.
42. In Re BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., No. 01-06-00980-CV, 2006 WL 3230760 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 9, 2006, orig. proceeding).
43. Id. at *2; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 18(c).
44. BP Prods., 2006 WL 3230760, at *2.
45. 208 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Oct 12, 2006, orig. proceeding). Baron &
Budd, P.C., the employer of each of the co-authors of this article, represents the plaintiffs
in this case.
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recent trend of protecting a toxic tort defendant from discovery requests
perceived as overbroad. The plaintiffs alleged development of cancer
from exposure to benzene while working on Exxon's premises. During
discovery, Exxon produced thousands of pages and made another 100,000
documents available for inspection. The plaintiffs deposed two witnesses
regarding Exxon's documents and their production; neither could confirm
that the plaintiffs had been given all responsive documents. The trial
court granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel Exxon to produce a depo-
nent fully responsive to the plaintiffs' queries regarding Exxon's docu-
ment production.
46
Conditionally granting Exxon's petition for writ of mandamus, the
Beaumont Court of Appeals directed the trial court to vacate its orders
mandating Exxon's deposition.47 First, the court noted that the plaintiffs'
initial discovery requests were "strikingly similar" to those held to be
overbroad in a prior benzene exposure case.48 Second, the court found
that attorney work product was necessarily involved when the plaintiffs
attempted to depose on Exxon attorney concerning the process by which
Exxon responded to production requests, and further noted that compel-
ling testimony from an attorney regarding his current litigation is "inap-
propriate under most circumstances." 49 Because the plaintiffs could not
show that any document had been withheld or that Exxon had otherwise




During the Survey period, the Texas courts continued to demonstrate a
growing enthusiasm to exercise mandamus jurisdiction to supervise trial
court proceedings. In In re Premcor Refining Group,51 the Beaumont
Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus in a per curiam opin-
ion, directing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs' permanent nuisance
claims for lack of standing because it was uncontested that the plaintiffs,
many of them minors, were not the record landowners at the time of the
initial injury to the property fifty or more years ago. 52 As the court
pointed out, a permanent nuisance claim, which encompasses lost value
as well as loss of enjoyment of the property, can be made only by the
landowner. 53 The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that, because
they had personal injury claims, they also had viable claims for loss of use
and enjoyment of the property on which they were injured.54 Because
46. Id. at 73-74.
47. Id. at 77.
48. Id. at 75.
49. Id. at 76.
50. Id. at 75-77.
51. 233 S.W.3d 904 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2007, orig. proceeding).
52. Id. at 910.




the claims were for the release of "noxious fumes, vapors, odors, hazard-
ous materials and other particulate matters, ' 55 it is possible that tempo-
rary nuisance claims would have been more successful. But the court
noted that characterizing the nuisance as permanent was consistent with
Texas law because discharge of such fumes and particulates from the de-
fendant's refinery, in operation since 1901, could be "presumed to con-
tinue indefinitely. ''56 The most provocative aspect of the opinion is the
court's determination that the issue was appropriate for mandamus. Not-
ing that the court would not usually grant mandamus to address pleas to
the jurisdiction because appeal is an adequate remedy, the court seemed
to find the issue appropriate for mandamus jurisdiction simply because, in
essence, mass toxic tort litigation is different.57 The court quoted the de-
fendant's representation that the plaintiffs' lawyer "threatens lawsuits on
behalf of thousands" of minor claimants who had no imminent deadline
for filing suit, and the court found "nothing in plaintiffs' response that
denies or takes issue with the gist of this statement . . . . 58 The court
concluded that "because of the size and complexity of the toxic tort litiga-
tion in question, it would be a prudent use of judicial resources to permit
a preliminary resolution of the issue of permanent nuisance" even though
the personal injury claims would survive and the case would therefore
continue. 59
4. Venue
In Gilcrease v. Garlock, Inc.,60 the El Paso Court of Appeals delivered
a stem lesson to plaintiffs who regret their choice of forum after filing suit
and would consider trying to change it. Fred Gilcrease developed
mesothelioma, a fatal form of cancer invariably attributed to asbestos ex-
posure, from working with Garlock gaskets among other products. Mr.
and Mrs. Gilcrease brought suit in Bexar County, and the court denied
Garlock's motion to transfer. After Mr. Gilcrease died, his children were
added as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs non-suited their claim against Garlock,
and the next day they asserted identical claims against Garlock in a new
suit in El Paso County. The trial court denied Garlock's motion to trans-
fer to Bexar County and tried the case to verdict. The jury awarded com-
pensatory damages of over $2.5 million and punitive damages of $1
million, but the combined amount of the award was exceeded by the
amount of plaintiffs' settlements with other parties. The trial court en-
tered a take-nothing judgment. On appeal, the court first held that the
trial court erred in offsetting the punitive damages award by settlements
received from other parties, reasoning that a punitive damages award is
55. Id. at 907.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 909.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 211 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.).
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not intended to compensate but to punish and is defendant-specific. 61
The court further held that even though settlements exceeded the com-
pensatory award and thus rendered the entire award uncollectable, the
plaintiffs were not prohibited from collecting the punitive award. 62 The
court acknowledged the rule that a plaintiff may not recover punitive
damages unless the jury also awards compensatory damages, but rea-
soned that in this case the jury did award compensatory damages; those
damages were just not recoverable because of the offset.63
On the verge of affirming a $1 million punitive damages award, the
court of appeals proceeded to void the results of the proceedings below,
holding that venue was improper in El Paso County. The court noted
that a "venue determination made prior to a nonsuit is conclusive in a
subsequent refiling of the same cause of action against the same parties,"
and ruled that when the Bexar County court denied the motion to trans-
fer, "the venue determination was fixed with regard to any subsequent
filing." 64 The court thus reversed the judgment in favor of Garlock and
remanded the case with instructions to transfer the matter to Bexar
County.65
In another, less painful venue case, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas overruled the plaintiff's choice of forum and
transferred a toxic tort case to the place of the plaintiff's exposure. 66 In
Overson v. Berryman Products, the plaintiff alleged personal injury from
exposure to benzene products in Arizona, and sued companies from vari-
ous states in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas. 67 In his first amended complaint, the plaintiff added as a defen-
dant an Arizona company, which would destroy diversity. After the court
denied the defendants' motion to transfer venue to Arizona, the plaintiff
moved to dismiss the Arizona defendant. On defendants' motion for re-
consideration, the court vacated its prior order and granted the defend-
ants' motion to transfer venue to the District of Arizona. In reaching this
decision, the court determined (and no party disputed) that jurisdiction
would be proper in the District of Arizona.68 Next, the court analyzed
the convenience to the parties and witnesses by weighing all private and
public interest factors. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs' choice of
forum weighed against transfer, but found this outweighed by the many
factors favoring transfer. In making this decision, the court considered
the fact that the benzene exposure and all other significant events oc-
curred in Arizona, that Arizona had a local interest to adjudicate a dis-
pute involving a local chemical exposure, that Arizona law would likely
61. Id. at 457.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 458-59.
64. Id. at 460.
65. Id.
66. Overson v. Berryman Prods., 461 F. Supp. 2d 537, 538 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
67. Id. at 540.
68. Id. at 539.
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apply, and "the most important factor" that a transfer would inconve-
nience key factual witnesses located in Arizona.69 Finally, the court
noted that since it was early in the litigation, the plaintiffs would not be
prejudiced by the transfer.70
5. Statute of Limitations
As discussed in previous Surveys,71 the long latency period that can
occur between toxic exposure and the manifestation of disease has raised
novel questions regarding the application of statutes of limitations as well
as related questions such as the timing of accrual and the retroactive ap-
plication of statutes. To avoid barring latent injury claims before they are
discovered, Texas courts apply the discovery rule, which tolls the statute
of limitations until the person filing suit knows or should have discovered
the nature of his injury. In the present Survey period, the facts presented
in two contrasting cases illustrate the circumstances under which the stat-
ute of limitations will or will not be tolled by the Texas discovery rule.
In Avance v. Kerr-McGee,72 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas held that evidence of similar contamination
from a different source was not sufficient to show that the plaintiffs had
been put on notice of the nature of their claims.73 The plaintiffs in Avance
sought damages caused by their alleged exposure to defendant's creosote
and pentachlorophenol from 1960 to 2004. The defendant moved for
summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs' claims were time-
barred because they had actual or constructive knowledge of the nature
of their injury more than two years before they filed suit. In support, the
defendant offered evidence of extensive publicity regarding health
hazards caused by creosote contamination from a different source in the
Texarkana area. The defendant also introduced evidence that several
lawsuits had been filed by area residents for personal injuries arising out
of their exposure to creosote in 1987 and that Congress had appropriated
$5 million for a federal buyout of the residents of Carver Terrace in
1990.74
The plaintiffs did not dispute that there had been extensive coverage of
creosote contamination, but they asserted that, because there was no evi-
dence that any of the plaintiffs lived in or near the areas that were the
subject of the publicity, a jury could reasonably conclude that they did
not have constructive knowledge regarding the cause of their injuries.
Additionally, the plaintiffs indicated that their doctors had not told them
their medical conditions were related to environmental exposure, and
69. Id. at 540.
70. Id. at 540-41.
71. See, e.g., Brent M. Rosenthal et al., Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 60 SMU L. REV.
1345, 1357 (2007); Brent M. Rosenthal et al., Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 59 SMU L. REV.
1579, 1589 (2006).
72. No. 5:04-CV-209-DF, 2007 WL 1229710, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2007).
73. Id. at *12.
74. Id. at *4-7.
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they provided affidavits to negate a finding of actual knowledge. 75 Find-
ing that the defendant's evidence was based primarily on other lawsuits
and publicity regarding hazards at other sites, the court held that there
was a genuine issue as to when the plaintiffs should have reasonably
known that their alleged injuries were caused or contributed to by the
substances at issue and denied summary judgment.76
By contrast, in Podolny v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., 7 7 the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment on limitations grounds. Podolny, who was diagnosed with pleural
calcification before 1996 and lung cancer in 1996, filed suit against Elliott
on August 22, 2002. Podolny claimed he was not aware that his lung can-
cer was attributable to asbestos exposure any sooner than October 2000,
when he was told by an attorney that his lung cancer was likely caused by
asbestos. He also contended that it was at least arguable that the running
of the limitations period was not triggered until January 2002, when a
medical doctor first attributed his lung cancer to asbestos exposure.
Other evidence was introduced, however, showing that Podolny had been
diagnosed with asbestosis in 1984, that six reports dated from 1985 to
1996 referred either to his past asbestos exposure, asbestosis, or the pres-
ence of pleural plaque or pleural calcification on his lungs, and that a
radiology report from April 2000 included the following notation: "Diag-
nosis: lung ca aesbestos [sic] exposure."78 Given that evidence, the court
found that, had Podolny exercised due diligence, he would have discov-
ered, before August 22, 2000, that his lung cancer was caused by asbestos
exposure. 79
6. Federal Removal Jurisdiction
Defendants in mass tort actions filed in state courts in Texas and else-
where often remove the cases to federal courts, which they perceive to
provide a more hospitable forum. In Philip Morris v. Watson,80 the
United States Supreme Court limited the ability of defendants to remove
cases under the federal officer removal statute, which permits removal of
any state court action brought against "any officer (or any person acting
under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in
an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office
.... "81 The plaintiffs in Watson filed suit in an Arkansas state court
alleging that Philip Morris, in violation of Arkansas consumer law, had
falsely marketed its cigarettes as "light" (containing less tar and nicotine),
when in fact the cigarettes delivered more tar and nicotine than the adjec-
75. Id. at *11.
76. Id. at *12.
77. No. 13-04-499-CV, 2007 WL 271118, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Feb. 1,
2007, no pet.).
78. Id. at *1.
79. Id. at *3.
80. 127 S. Ct. 2301 (2007).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2000).
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tive "light" indicates. The plaintiffs further alleged that in testing its light
cigarettes with a method prescribed by the Federal Trade Commission,
Philip Morris obtained lower measurements of tar and nicotine than the
levels that would be generated by ordinary use of the products. Philip
Morris removed the case to federal court on the theory that because its
testing method was dictated by federal regulations, it was a "person act-
ing under" a federal officer within the meaning of the federal removal
statute.82 Both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit upheld the removal, but the United States Supreme
Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Breyer, reversed. 83
The Court noted that although a private person assisting a federal officer
in the performance of her duties may be a "federal officer" within the
meaning of the statute, "the help or assistance necessary to bring a pri-
vate person within the scope of the statute does not include simply com-
plying with the law."'84 This remains true, the Court said, "even if the
regulation is highly detailed and even if the private firm's activities are
highly supervised and monitored. ' '85
B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Scope of Duty
Another distinctive characteristic of toxic torts-the tendency for toxic
substances to migrate and cause injury away from the location in which
they were actually used-raises the novel issue of whether an actor has a
duty to avoid causing injury to persons situated outside of the vicinity of
the product's use. In the context of toxic injury cases, Texas courts have
been reluctant to impose upon defendants a duty to use care to avoid
injury caused by toxic substances that have migrated beyond the area of
use.86 In determining whether such a duty should be imposed, Texas
courts have focused on whether the defendant could have reasonably
foreseen that its conduct or premises condition would create a risk of
injury to persons in the circumstances of the plaintiff. At this time, how-
ever, Texas case law does not offer much certainty as to what evidence is
necessary to show that manufacturers, premises owners, and other actors
could have reasonably foreseen the risks associated with "take-home" ex-
posure to asbestos.
This lack of a clear direction in existing case law likely explains, at least
in part, the profound difficulty experienced by the Fourteenth District
Houston Court of Appeals in issuing a final opinion in Exxon Corp. v.
Altimore.87 The court initially decided the case on August 1, 2006, but
82. Watson, 127 S. Ct. at 2304.
83. Id. at 2310.
84. Id. at 2307.
85. Id. at 2308.
86. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Altimore, No. 14-04-01133-CV, 2008 WL 885955, at
*9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 3, 2008, no pet.); Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235
S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed).
87. Altimore. 2008 WL 885955.
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withdrew and reissued its opinion three times, most recently on April 3,
2008.88 As explained in last year's Survey,89 Altimore involved a typical
"take-home" exposure fact pattern: a wife contracted mesothelioma al-
legedly caused by her exposure to asbestos dust transported into the
home on the work clothes of her husband. The jury in Altimore found
that Exxon, the husband's employer, acted negligently and with malice in
allowing the husband to leave its premises with asbestos-laden clothing,
and awarded compensatory damages (entirely offset by settlements from
other defendants) and punitive damages. In its first opinion, issued on
August 1, 2006, the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for
Exxon, holding that because the risk of harm to the wives of its employ-
ees was not reasonably foreseeable, Exxon owed no duty to Mrs. Al-
timore. The court issued revised opinions on December 7, 2006, and
April 19, 2007, adhering to the result but explaining why, in its view, the
evidence presented by Mrs. Altimore did not establish a basis for impos-
ing a duty on Exxon. The latter opinion, however, drew a concurrence
from Justice Seymour, who argued that the majority should have decided
the case on the narrower ground that the evidence was legally insufficient
to support the jury's award of punitive damages.
Mrs. Altimore filed a fourth motion for rehearing. By the time the
court considered the motion, the two members of the majority had left
the court. On April 3, 2008, the court again denied the motion for re-
hearing, but its revised opinion-this time authored by Judge Seymour-
assumed without deciding that Exxon owed a duty to Mrs. Altimore as a
household member of an employee occupationally exposed to asbestos.90
Invoking the heightened standard required for an assessment of punitive
damages, the court held that it could not find clear and convincing evi-
dence that, "when viewed objectively from Exxon's standpoint, there was
an extreme risk of serious injury to [Mrs. Altimore] during the relevant
period of time." 91 As of this date, no motion for rehearing or petition for
review in the Texas Supreme Court has been filed, so the parties' three-
year appellate odyssey appears to be at an end.
In a second "take-home" exposure case, Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer,92 the
Dallas Court of Appeals required only one opinion to decide that the
defendant Alcoa did not owe a duty to avoid exposing the family member
of an employee to asbestos through "take-home" exposure. In that case,
the plaintiff, who was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2003, alleged that
the disease was caused by asbestos transferred from the Alcoa plant in
Rockdale, Texas, into her home via her husband's work clothes during
88. Although the court's withdrawn opinions are no longer available on Westlaw, the
procedural history of the case may be found on the Fourteenth District's website, http://
www.14thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/case.asp?FilinglD=86579.
89. Brent M. Rosenthal et al., Toxic Torts and Mass Torts, 60 SMU L. REV. 1345, 1357-
59 (2007).
90. Altimore, 2008 WL 885955, at *1.
91. Id. at *9.
92. Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. filed).
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the 1950s. The court considered whether the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's finding that an employer that used, but did not manu-
facture, asbestos could foresee the risk of injury from take-home expo-
sure. As evidence of foreseeability, the plaintiff pointed to case reports
from the 1930s concerning respiratory disease in asbestos workers, a 1948
Alcoa memorandum noting a requirement that employees change clothes
and shower following exposure to a chemical product, the 1952 Walsh-
Healy Public Contracts Act which mandated that workers not be exposed
to hazardous concentrations of contaminants, and a 1958 Texas regulation
setting maximum permissible concentrations of atmospheric contami-
nants. 93 The court was not persuaded. Instead, relying on a 1965 case
study that first discussed non-occupational exposure and the 1972 OSHA
regulations that first imposed restrictions related to "take-home" expo-
sure, the court found that the risk would not have been foreseeable in the
1950s. The court thus reversed the $15.6 million judgment, holding that
the defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff at the time of her
exposure. 9
4
2. Breach of Duty
In Parker v. Three Rivers Flying Service, Inc.,95 the Eastland Court of
Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants
performing aerial pesticide application, finding that there was no evi-
dence that the defendant breached the applicable standard of care.96 The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were negligent in spraying mala-
thion, and that Joyce Parker suffered personal injuries as a result of expo-
sure to the pesticide. On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should have been applied to show that the
defendant breached its duty and that, even if the doctrine did not apply,
the evidence was sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether the defend-
ants breached the standard of care during pesticide applications.97
In support of the res ipsa loquitur issue, the plaintiffs relied on Farm
Services, Inc. v. Gonzalez,98 in which the court found that "the sudden
discharge of a large amount of concentrated, toxic pesticide by a crop-
dusting airplane en route to its destination is an event which ordinarily
would not occur in the absence of negligence." 99 The court distinguished
Gonzalez by noting that it had "involved the sudden and unexpected dis-
charge of pesticide resulting from a defect or [equipment] failure" rather
than "off-target movement" of pesticide during application, as occurred
in the present case. 10° The court explained that pesticide drift of this na-
93. Id. at 461-62.
94. Id.
95. 220 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, no pet.).
96. Id. at 171.
97. Id. at 162-63.
98. 756 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied.)
99. Parker, 220 S.W.3d at 168 (quoting Gonzalez, 756 S.W.2d at 752).
100. Id.
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ture was a common occurrence and was not the type of event that would
not be expected to occur in the absence of negligence. 10 1
In deciding whether the evidence was sufficient to create a fact issue
regarding a breach of duty, the court first held that expert testimony was
required to establish the standard of care because a lay person would not
have experience regarding the appropriate standards for aerial applica-
tion of pesticides. 10 2 The court further concluded that the testimony of
the plaintiffs' expert was insufficient to create a fact issue. In particular,
the court rejected the expert's opinions that the defendants should have
notified the plaintiffs prior to spraying and that the defendants should
have allowed for a 300-foot buffer zone when spraying because the expert
could not point to any particular regulations or information promulgated
by a public agency to show that these were applicable standards of care in
Texas. The court also found that, although an applicable standard of care
required that pesticide application be avoided when wind speeds were
above ten miles per hour, there was no evidence of a breach of that stan-
dard.'0 3 The plaintiffs attempted to establish that the defendants
breached that standard through records showing that average wind veloc-
ity exceeded ten miles per hour in three neighboring areas on that day.
The court, however, concluded that evidence of wind speed in the other
areas did not tend to show that wind speed exceeded ten miles per hour
at the application site.10 4
3. Causation
By far the most significant and highly publicized development in the
area of mass torts in Texas in this Survey period was the application by
Texas courts of a more demanding standard for proving causation in toxic
tort cases than that traditionally applied. The leading case on this subject,
and surely a landmark case in the history of toxic tort litigation in Texas,
was Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores.10 5 In that case, the plaintiff claimed
that he had developed asbestosis as a result of his exposure to asbestos-
containing brake pads during his career as a brake mechanic from 1966
through 2001. The plaintiff presented evidence that he used brake prod-
ucts from several manufacturers, and offered specific proof that he used
brake pads manufactured by Borg-Warner from 1972 through 1975. The
plaintiff testified that he used Borg-Warner brake pads "on five to seven
of the roughly twenty brake jobs" he did each week during this period.1 6
Flores' job required him to grind the brake pads so they would not
101. Id.
102. Id. at 168-69 (citing Hager v. Romines, 913 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1995, no writ)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 169-70.
105. 232 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007). Baron & Budd (the employer of each of the co-au-
thors of this article) represented the plaintiff, Mr. Flores, before the Texas Supreme Court
but not in the trial court.
106. Id. at 766.
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squeal; "[t]he grinding generated clouds of dust that Flores inhaled while
working in a room that measured roughly eight by ten feet. ' 10 7 The
Borg-Warner brake pads contained seven to twenty-eight percent asbes-
tos by weight depending on the type of pad. The plaintiff presented ex-
pert testimony that he had developed asbestosis and that his work as a
brake mechanic caused his disease. The jury found Borg-Warner liable,
assessed its responsibility vis-A-vis the settling defendants at thirty-seven
percent, and awarded the plaintiff a total of $114,000 in actual damages
and $55,000 in punitive damages. The trial judge entered judgment on
the verdict after appropriate offsets for settlements and denied Borg-
Warner's post-trial motions. A unanimous court of appeals affirmed,108
and the Texas Supreme Court granted Borg-Warner's petition for review.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Jefferson, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for Borg-Warner, find-
ing the evidence legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that the
plaintiff's exposure to Borg-Warner products was a substantial cause of
his asbestosis. 10 9 The opinion began by reciting a causation test for asbes-
tos cases expressed in a twenty year-old federal case applying Maryland
law, Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.1 10 Under the "frequency,
regularity, and proximity" test announced in Lohrmann, the plaintiff
must show "evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis
over some extended period of time in proximity to where the plaintiff
actually worked." ' The opinion notes that the amicus curiae supporting
the defendant urged the court to adopt the "Lohrmann test," and finds
the test "appropriate," but adds that the test is not demanding enough of
plaintiffs; the terms frequency, regularity, and proximity "do not, in them-
selves, capture the emphasis our jurisprudence has placed on causation as
an essential predicate to liability."112 The opinion points out that the
plaintiff "seemingly satisf[ied] Lohrmann's frequency-regularity-proxim-
ity test" by presenting evidence that he "worked in a small room, grinding
brake pads composed partially of embedded asbestos fibers, five to seven
times per week over a four-year period. .. ,1113 But the supreme court
nevertheless found the evidence legally insufficient to allow the jury to
find causation, because the evidence "provides none of the quantitative
information necessary to support causation under Texas law."' 1 4
The opinion suggests that to establish causation, the plaintiff in an as-
bestos case-and, by extension, any toxic tort case-must now provide
both evidence of the dose of the toxin to which the plaintiff was exposed
and evidence that the toxin, in that amount, was capable of producing
107. Id.
108. See Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 153 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2004), rev'd, 232 S.W.3d 765 (2007).
109. Borg-Warner, 232 S.W.3d at 765, 773-74.
110. 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).
111. Borg-Warner, 232 S.W.3d at 769 (quoting Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1162-63).
112. Id. at 770.
113. Id. at 772.
114. Id.
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injury. In Borg-Warner, the plaintiff unquestionably showed that he was
exposed to asbestos from the defendant's product, but introduced "noth-
ing about how much asbestos Flores might have inhaled. '115 "[A]bsent
any evidence of dose, the jury could not evaluate the quantity of respira-
ble asbestos to which Flores might have been exposed or whether those
amounts were sufficient to cause asbestosis. Nor did Flores introduce ev-
idence regarding what percentage of that indeterminate amount may
have originated in Borg-Warner products. 11 6 The supreme court pur-
ported to "recognize the proof difficulties accompanying asbestos
claims, 11 7 but insisted that to show "substantial-factor causation" it was
incumbent upon the plaintiff to show "the approximate quantum of fibers
to which [he] was exposed."1 18
In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Stephens,119 the First District Houston
Court of Appeals applied the Borg-Warner decision to the case of a
mesothelioma victim. The plaintiff testified that he used the defendant's
product "quite a bit on jobs" in the 1960s and 1970s and that he swept up
after other workers applied and sanded the defendant's product, which he
saw "on a substantial number of jobs." 120 But as in Borg-Warner, the
experts did not provide a "quantitative estimate" of the plaintiff's expo-
sure, and the epidemiological studies on which the plaintiff's experts re-
lied did not establish "the minimum exposure level (or dosage) of joint
compound with a statistically increased risk of developing" mesothe-
lioma. 12 1 Although the studies showed that workers are exposed to as-
bestos when working around mixing, sanding, or sweeping of joint
compound products, and that joint compound exposure causes mesothe-
lioma, the studies did not establish how much exposure to joint com-
pound dust was needed to cause a statistically significant rise in the
disease. In a footnote, however, the court suggested that a plaintiff might
be able to meet its test if he proves up the scientific evidence "that links
mesothelioma with 'low levels of asbestos exposure.' 1 22
Subsequent to the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in Borg-Warner Corp.
v. Flores, but before the decision in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Stephens,
Judge Mark Davidson, the Texas district judge overseeing the Texas mul-
tidistrict asbestos litigation, issued a letter ruling on the defendants' sum-
mary judgment motions to address the application of the Borg-Warner
opinion.' 2 3 Like the Stephens court, Judge Davidson first determined
that the Borg-Warner analysis applied to mesothelioma cases as well as
115. Id. at 771-72.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 772.
118. Id. at 774.
119. 239 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
120. Id. at 313.
121. Id. at 321.
122. ld. at 321 n.12.
123. See Letter Ruling, In re Asbestos, No. 2004-3,964 (11th Dist. Ct., Harris County,
Tex., July 18, 2007), available at http://www.justex.netlJustexDocuments/1/Judges%20
Orders/Post%2OBorg%20Warner%20MFSJ.pdf [hereinafter "Davidson Ruling"].
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asbestosis cases, but he recognized that a lower level of exposure could be
a substantial cause of mesothelioma. 124 While acknowledging that scien-
tists believe that every single exposure to asbestos is a potential cause of
mesothelioma, Judge Davidson said that not every exposure could be
considered a substantial cause. 125 The court then contrasted the evidence
in two specific cases. 126 In Pena, the decedent had not been deposed. His
sons' testimony, while it described his work with joint compound and
identified the defendant's product as one of the products used, did not
provide information from which one could approximate dose, such as the
total amount or percentage of the defendant's product used. Judge Da-
vidson found this evidence legally insufficient to prove causation. 127 In
Shake, the injured plaintiff was alive and able to provide testimony about
the amount of each defendant's product used. He also provided expert
testimony estimating the exposure levels during various activities. The
court found that this evidence met the causation standard set forth in
Borg-Warner.128
The Texas courts' demand for more specific proof of causation was not
confined to asbestos cases. In Abraham v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 129
some 300 current and former employees sued Union Pacific under the
Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA"), alleging that their various
diseases-including cancer and respiratory and skin conditions-were
caused by their workplace exposure to creosote used to treat railroad ties.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Union Pacific on all
claims, holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce legally sufficient evi-
dence that their workplace exposure caused their illnesses. On appeal,
the Fourteenth District Houston Court of Appeals first held that the
"featherweight" standard of causation in FELA cases does not relax the
standard of reliability that expert scientific testimony must meet to estab-
lish that a toxic exposure caused an injury.130 The court then reviewed
the plaintiffs' expert's methodology in determining causation and found it
unreliable.131 The expert had attempted to quantify the plaintiffs' expo-
sure to creosote by extrapolating from a study of workers applying creo-
sote products to wood poles and railroad ties and assigning an exposure
level estimate based on length of employment to each plaintiff. But while
the exposures described in the study were measured by job category-
and indicated high exposure levels and increased cancer risk for "han-
dlers"-the summary judgment evidence did not reveal the plaintiffs' job
categories and provided no basis to conclude that their exposures would
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. at 3.
126. See Pena v. Bondex, No. 2006-51,043 (11th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. July 18,
2007); Shake v. Quigley, No. 2004-21,092 (11th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex. July 18, 2007).
127. Davidson Ruling, supra note 123, at 4.
128. Id. at 4-5.
129. 233 S.W.3d 13 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1900 (2008).
130. Id. at 19-20.
131. Id. at 23-24.
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have been the same or greater than the exposures found in the study.132
The court thus upheld the trial court's blanket exclusion of the expert's
testimony that the plaintiffs' exposure to creosote caused their injuries.1 33
While Texas courts were unwilling to defer to jury findings of causation
in toxic tort cases in which the proof was arguably sketchy, the Dallas
Court of Appeals readily affirmed a jury finding that the plaintiffs' expo-
sure to toxic fumes did not cause them to develop reactive airway dys-
function symptoms in Barfield v. SST Truck Co. 134 On appeal, the
plaintiffs contended that the evidence of the defendant's negligence, the
causal relationship between the fumes generated by the defendant's neg-
ligence, and damages was conclusive. The court rejected this ambitious
argument, noting that "almost every fact alleged by one party was dis-
puted by the other" in the six-week trial,135 including the days per week
that the oven generating the fumes was used, the concentration of the
toxins in the air, and the effect of the fumes on the plaintiffs.
136
Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases found a more receptive audience in federal
courts during the survey period, both on questions of admissibility and
sufficiency of causation evidence. In O'Neill v. Seariver Maritime, Inc.,137
a per curiam opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for the plaintiffs, finding
sufficient evidence that the plaintiff seaman's exposure to hydrogen sul-
fide vapor caused his neurological injuries and asthma symptoms and
finding that the court did not err by admitting the testimony of the plain-
tiff's expert. The plaintiff, who sampled tanks of crude oil onboard a
ship, reported seeing a plume of vapor in the same area where hydrogen
sulfide vapors were measured at 200 parts per million ("ppm") two days
later. An expert testified that visible vapor in that spot would have been
more than 200 ppm, and the plaintiff and other crew members suffered
symptoms consistent with high level hydrogen sulfide exposure. The
court concluded that, under the more lenient causation standards of the
Jones Act, the trial court did not commit clear error in finding that expo-
sure to hydrogen sulfide at greater than 200 ppm caused the plaintiff's
injuries. 138 The court also ruled that the plaintiff's expert's reliance on
the symptoms that followed the plaintiff's exposure to hydrogen sulfide in
forming his causation opinion did not make his opinion unreliable.
139
The expert provided a scientific explanation for connecting the exposure
132. Id. at 21-23.
133. Id. at 24. In contrast, a federal court presiding over similar claims involving expo-
sure to creosote refused to order blanket exclusion of the testimony of different experts
supporting the plaintiffs' theory of causation, concluding that the reliability of the testi-
mony could better be addressed on a case-by-case basis. See Avance v. Kerr-McGee
Chem., L.L.C., No. 5:04CV209, 2006 WL 3912472, at *15 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2006).
134. 220 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).
135. Id. at 208-09.
136. Id. at 209-10.
137. 246 F. App'x 278 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
138. Id. at 280.
139. Id. at 281.
2008] 1173
SMU LAW REVIEW
and the symptoms that followed. The court held that the expert ade-
quately excluded possible alternative causes from the plaintiff's child-
hood to make his testimony admissible, finding any weaknesses in his
analysis should have been dealt with in cross examination. 140
In Burton v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories Division of American Home
Products Corp.,141 the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas found that the plaintiff's evidence that her ingestion of diet
drugs caused her to develop pulmonary arterial hypertension (PAH) and
progressive heart valve regurgitation was reliable, admissible, and suffi-
cient to withstand summary judgment. The defendant claimed that the
plaintiff's condition-PAH with exercise-was a different disease than
the more catastrophic PAH at rest, and that the expert opinion that diet
drugs caused the plaintiff's "exercise PAH" was unsupported by the sci-
entific literature, which reported an increase only in "resting PAH" in
users of diet drugs. After examining the literature and the affidavits filed
by the parties, the court refused to recognize "exercise PAH" and "rest-
ing PAH" as different diseases, noting that "[m]edical science appears not
to have made this distinction, and neither will this court.' 42 The court
added that even though one of the two epidemiological studies relied on
by the plaintiff to show a causal connection between her diet drug use
and her PAH only reported an increase in "resting PAH," she could rely
on the other study, which did not expressly identify the sub-type of PAH
observed. 143 The court thus allowed the plaintiff to proceed to a jury
determination of her claims of a causal relationship between her use of
the defendant's product and her injuries.1 44
4. Punitive Damages
Courts and commentators have struggled for decades to establish rea-
sonable ground rules for the recovery of punitive damages in mass tort
litigation, but questions continue to abound. 145 Is each person injured by
a mass tort entitled to claim and recover punitive damages? What is the
measure of damages available to each plaintiff injured by a mass tort, and
to what extent may the award be influenced by the effect of the defen-
dant's tortious conduct on other individuals? Does the Constitution im-
pose any limitation on the aggregate amount of punitive damages
awarded to plaintiffs based on the same course of tortious conduct by the
140. Id.
141. 513 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (mem. op.).
142. Id. at 724.
143. Id. at 732-33.
144. Id. at 733.
145. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE
L.J. 347, 432 (2003) ("The multiple punishments problem has confounded jurists and schol-
ars for the better part of the past three decades."); Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punish-
ments Problem: A Call for a National Punitive Damages Registry, 99 Nw. L. REV. 1613,
1615 (2005) (observing that "[t]he multiple punitive damages problem was first identified
in the 1960s by Judge Friendly" in his landmark opinion in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967)).
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defendant, and, if so, how is the constitutional limit calculated? 146
The United States Supreme Court provided a qualified answer to one
of these questions in Philip Morris USA v. Williams.147 In that case, the
plaintiff alleged that her deceased husband, Jesse Williams, developed fa-
tal lung cancer from smoking cigarettes made and sold by Philip Morris,
and further alleged that Philip Morris knowingly deceived him through
advertising and other representations into believing it was safe to smoke.
In argument, the plaintiff's attorney urged the jury to "think about how
many other Jesse Williams in the last 40 years in the State of Oregon
there have been" in considering the appropriate amount of punitive dam-
ages to award.148 The jury awarded compensatory damages of just over
$800,000, and punitive damages of $79.5 million. After the case made
trips up, down, and back up the appellate ladder, the punitive damages
award arrived intact at the Supreme Court for consideration of whether it
was constitutionally excessive.
In a five-to-four decision authored by Justice Breyer, the Court vacated
the punitive damages award, holding that "the Constitution's Due Pro-
cess Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they
directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essen-
tially, strangers to the litigation."'1 49 The Court noted that it was unfair to
allow a jury to base punishment of a defendant on wrongs allegedly com-
mitted against nonparties because the defendant "has no opportunity to
defend [itself] against the charge.' 150 The Court also observed that al-
lowing a jury to punish the defendant "for injuring a nonparty victim
would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equa-
tion.' 151 But the Court hastened to add that although a jury cannot con-
stitutionally "punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged
to have visited on nonparties,"' 52 a plaintiff may admit evidence showing
harm to others to demonstrate the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct. Such evidence, the Court said, "can help to show that the con-
duct that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the
general public, and so was particularly reprehensible . . . . ,,153 Justices
Stevens, Thomas, Ginsberg, and Scalia dissented. In her dissent, Justice
Ginsberg called the majority ruling "inexplicable" and noted the confu-
sion likely to be engendered by a rule allowing a jury to consider evi-
146. Although the United States Supreme Court has never addressed these questions,
the Texas Supreme Court has stated that the federal due process clause limits the total
amount of punitive damages that a defendant that has committed a mass tort must actually
pay. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 48-51 (Tex. 1998).
Neither that court nor any other has explained how the limit is quantified.
147. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
148. Id. at 1061.
149. Id. at 1063.
150. Id.
151. Id.




dence of harm to others in assessing the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct but forbidding a jury from punishing the defendant
for inflicting that harm.154
In a less historic but more useful decision to Texas litigators, the El
Paso Court of Appeals held in Gilcrease v. Garlock, Inc.,155 that an award
of punitive damages is recoverable even if the entire compensatory award
is offset by settlements with other parties. The court observed that
"[u]nder the one satisfaction rule, the non-settling defendant may only
claim a credit based on the damages for which all tortfeasors are jointly
liable,"'1 56 and noted that tortfeasors are not jointly liable for punitive
damages assessed against a single defendant. The court reasoned that
because "[t]he jury assessed exemplary damages against Garlock alone,"
the jury "[was] not entitled to offset its personal liability for exemplary
damages by the amount of common damages paid by the settling defend-
ants. ' 157 The court added that the plaintiffs were not prevented from
enforcing the punitive damages award by the rule that recovery of actual
damages is a prerequisite to the receipt of exemplary damages.1 58 The
court pointed out that the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
"speaks in terms of the award of actual damages by the jury rather than
their recovery,1 59 and noted that the cap on exemplary damages similarly
bases the limits on the actual damages "found by the jury,' 160 not those
collectible by the plaintiff. Thus, had venue not been improperly laid, the
plaintiffs probably would have been entitled to collect the punitive dam-
ages assessed against Garlock by the jury.161
5. Defenses
a. Learned Intermediary
In Ackermann v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals,162 a federal district court,
adopting a magistrate's recommendation, applied the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine to bar a claim in which the plaintiff alleged that an inade-
quate warning on an antidepressant provided by a doctor for her husband
resulted in her husband's suicide. Shortly before his suicide, Martin Ack-
erman had briefly taken Effexor, an antidepressant manufactured by the
defendant and given to him by Dr. Sonn. Mr. Ackerman's widow alleged
that the warning on the drug package insert was inadequate and should
have warned "that for a small subset of patients, suicidal ideation is a risk
154. Id. at 1068-69 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
155. 211 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.).
156. Id. at 457.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 457-59.
159. Id. at 458 (emphasis in original) (citing TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 41.004(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
160. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 41.008(b)(1)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
161. Id. at 460.
162. 471 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
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of taking Effexor."'1 63 But Dr. Sonn testified that even had there been a
warning as advocated by the plaintiff, he would still have prescribed the
drug as he did and would not have told Mr. Ackermann of such warnings
because he did not want to suggest to a depressed patient that suicide was
an option. The court noted that "[u]nder Texas law, a plaintiff who com-
plains 'that a prescription drug warning is inadequate must also show that
the alleged inadequacy caused her doctor to prescribe the drug for
her."1 64 Noting that "this [was] not a case where the learned intermedi-
ary fails to pass necessary information to the patient because the manu-
facturer has understated the degree of risk," the district court ruled that
the defendant was "entitled to Summary Judgment on the learned inter-
mediary doctrine. ' 165
b. Federal Preemption
The doctrine of federal preemption is most often invoked by defend-
ants in personal injury cases who argue that a scheme of federal regula-
tions is inconsistent with, and therefore overrides, state liability
standards. In In re Global Santa Fe Corp.,166 the Fourteenth District
Houston Court of Appeals turned this typical scenario on its head, ruling
that the Jones Act, 167 a federal statute providing a remedy for maritime
injuries, preempted the application of a Texas law requiring the plaintiff
to meet strict impairment criteria in silicosis cases. The plaintiff in Global
Santa Fe filed a Jones Act case against the defendant in state court alleg-
ing that the defendant had failed to provide him with a safe and seawor-
thy vessel on which to work, resulting in his injurious exposure to silica.
The defendant, invoking recently enacted chapter 90 of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code, effected a transfer of the case to the MDL pretrial
court presiding over the silica cases. 16 8 In addition to authorizing transfer
of silica cases to the MDL court, chapter 90 requires plaintiffs alleging
silica injuries to file a report demonstrating a specified level of impair-
ment before their cases may proceed.' 69 The plaintiff objected to the
transfer, arguing that chapter 90 is preempted by the Jones Act, which
does not require the plaintiff to make a threshold showing of impairment.
The MDL pretrial court agreed with the plaintiff and remanded the case
to the court in which the case was originally filed. The defendant sought
mandamus requiring the MDL pretrial court to retain the case. The
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals denied the request, holding that in
requiring proof of impairment chapter 90 "thwarts federal remedies" pro-
163. Id. at 746.
164. Id. at 747 (quoting Portersfield v. Etticon, Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 468 (5th Cir. 1999)).
165. Id. at 748.
166. No. 14-06-00625-CV, 2006 WL 3716495, at *1, 5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Dec. 19, 2006, orig. proceeding, [mand. pending]).
167. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006).
168. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 90.010(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
169. See Global Santa Fe, 2006 WL 3716495, at *4 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 90.001 cmt. (Vernon Supp. 2008)).
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vided in the Jones Act, and is therefore preempted in Jones Act cases. 170
The court added that chapter 90's requirement that the plaintiff demon-
strate that his silica exposure is the "most probable cause" of his impair-
ment is inconsistent with the "featherweight" causation standard applied
in Jones Act cases. 171 The defendant filed a petition for mandamus in the
Texas Supreme Court, which heard oral argument on January 16, 2008.172
C. CONCLUSION
Despite the developments appearing to discourage the filing of toxic
tort and mass tort cases in Texas, at least one commentator is unwilling to
proclaim the death of such litigation. Professor Deborah Hensler, who
has studied mass tort litigation for years, notes that mass tort litigation is
"the product of a complex set of socio-legal factors" including "advances
in medical technology, regulatory failure, mass culture, the economics of
civil litigation,. . . [and] the rise of the Internet."'1 73 Given the continuing
strength of these phenomena," she finds "it difficult to believe that mass
toxic tort litigation has collapsed. ' 174 As the political environment
evolves and the composition of the state judiciary slowly changes accord-
ingly, toxic and mass tort litigation may well regain its prominence in the
Texas legal landscape. For now, though, in the words of Professor Hen-
sler, "[t]he fat lady has not sung her last aria-but at the moment she is
singing a different tune. 1 75
170. Id. at *5.
171. Id.
172. Submission Schedule, Texas Supreme Court (last visited Jan. 16, 2008), http:Hwww.
supreme.courts.state.tx.us/oralarguments/pdf/011608.pdf.
173. Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Torts, 26 REV.
LInI. 883, 888 (2007).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 890.
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